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A Peacekeeping Mission in Afghanistan
Pipedream or Path to Stability?
Maj Ryan C. Van Wie, USa
Abstract1
This article analyzes how an international peacekeeping operation (PKO) can 
support an intra- Afghan peace settlement by mitigating information and com-
mitment problems and fostering compliance during the settlement’s implementa-
tion phase. To frame the information and commitment problems currently hin-
dering an intra- Afghan settlement, I briefly review noncooperative bargaining 
theory, its application to civil conflicts, and how PKOs can lessen mutual uncer-
tainty and foster stability. Anchoring this research on Afghanistan, I analyze the 
first peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan, the 1988–1990 United Nations Good 
Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP). UNGOMAP’s 
eventual failure to foster peace highlights Afghanistan’s complexities and the dan-
gers of an insufficiently resourced PKO operating in a state without a viable, 
incentive- compatible settlement. I apply these lessons to policy analysis, where I 
explore possible PKO options and their potential for incentivizing compliance 
with a future intra- Afghan deal. Though a viable PKO currently seems improbable 
given Afghanistan’s ongoing violence and the Taliban’s insistence on the complete 
withdrawal of foreign forces, future conditions may change, and I highlight neces-
sary prerequisites where a PKO may become possible. If designed properly, an 
Afghanistan PKO can fill a critical monitoring and verification capacity and bol-
ster Afghanistan’s prospects for long- term stability.
Introduction
The possibility of a stable Afghanistan presents a welcome opportunity for the 
Afghan people, who have endured 42 years of continuous civil conflict. If warring 
parties can reach an incentive- compatible, bargained settlement, then all have 
much to gain from the cessation of ongoing hostilities. Beyond benefiting parties 
within Afghanistan, a stable Afghanistan would benefit neighboring states and 
the international community, who have dealt with the negative externalities of 
Afghanistan’s civil conflicts.2 It is widely recognized that a political settlement 
among Afghan parties is the most practical way to end the fighting and attain 
lasting stability.3 Given the large risks associated with Afghanistan’s civil conflict 
continuing, the United States should assess the viability of an international peace-
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keeping operation (PKO) that may alleviate Government of Afghanistan (GOA) 
uncertainties in negotiations with the Taliban and support compliance with an 
eventual intra- Afghan peace settlement.4
The US–Taliban settlement, signed on 29 February 2020, provides a starting 
point for intra- Afghan talks and a conditional exit strategy for remaining US and 
NATO forces.5 If the Taliban continue negotiations with GOA, maintain a re-
duction in violence, and uphold their commitment that Afghanistan will not be 
used as a terrorist safe haven, then all US and NATO forces could be completely 
withdrawn from Afghanistan by 2021. Increasing US domestic pressure to end 
the 19-year US military mission is impacting political decision making, and it is 
unlikely that US/NATO forces will remain in Afghanistan for the long term, 
despite the Taliban’s continuing offensives against the GOA.6 Widespread uncer-
tainty remains regarding the possibility of a bargained settlement between the 
Taliban and the GOA, as evidenced by the latter’s May 2020 announcement that 
Kabul would continue large- scale offensive operations against the Taliban.7
Uncertainty over an intra- Afghan settlement is manifested in two primary 
forms. First, it is unknown if warring parties can reach a feasible settlement, espe-
cially without US/NATO forces maintaining coercive pressure to compel the 
Taliban to negotiate with the GOA. Potential impacts to Afghanistan’s political 
structure, legal system, security forces, disarmament, reintegration, and civil liber-
ties all remain unknown, and there is deep, mutual mistrust. Second, if a settle-
ment is reached, there is significant uncertainty as to whether internal parties 
would comply with the settlement’s provisions, especially without a credible en-
forcement mechanism to deter violations. If intra- Afghan parties do reach a bar-
gained settlement, the historical record and conflict research suggests there will be 
incentives to cheat or spoil the peace process among Afghanistan’s numerous 
armed groups, complex tribal networks, and regional power brokers.8 Further, 
given Afghanistan’s rugged terrain, remote villages, and the GOA’s limited reach, 
covert defections will likely go unobserved, increasing incentives to cheat.
Noncooperative bargaining models in civil conflict settings provide helpful 
starting points for analyzing these complex problems.9 These models advance in-
formation asymmetries and commitment problems as driving factors resulting in 
bargaining failures. If unaddressed, these problems may prevent combatants from 
reaching settlements or lead to relapsed fighting after a settlement is reached. 
Conflict research also suggests monitoring and verification mechanisms may offer 
partial relief from commitment and information problems and incentivize com-
pliance with peace settlements.10 Given the US strategic interest in fostering 
long- term stability in Afghanistan, the US government should advocate for a 
proven monitoring and verification mechanism in postconflict environments—an 
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international PKO.11 While the United States cannot direct other states to con-
tribute to a PKO, Washington can leverage US diplomatic and economic power 
to identify willing contributors, secure financial donors, and shepherd the process 
through the UN Security Council (UNSC).
Two critical scope conditions are required for a PKO to be a viable option in 
Afghanistan. First, the Taliban and the GOA must successfully negotiate an 
incentive- compatible, intra- Afghan peace settlement.12 Second, Afghan parties 
(including the Taliban, the GOA, opposition, and civil society leaders) and the 
future Afghan government must consent to an international PKO.13 Objectively, 
these scope conditions seem improbable given ongoing violence and the Taliban’s 
insistence on the complete withdrawal of foreign forces. However, it is also im-
probable that 150,000 Taliban could decisively defeat the GOA’s 300,000 soldiers 
and take over Afghanistan.14 As ongoing fighting imposes large costs on the 
GOA, it also imposes costs on the Taliban—costs that may not be sustainable in 
the long run. To end a costly status quo and gain desired reforms, the Taliban may 
willingly accept a short- term, consent- based PKO in the future, in exchange for 
bargained concessions that produce an incentive- compatible agreement. If the 
United States and the international community lay the groundwork for a credible 
PKO and it becomes a viable option during intra- Afghan negotiations, then it 
may offer both sides relief from information asymmetries and commitment prob-
lems and incentivize settlement compliance during the implementation phase.
Since an Afghanistan PKO has not been seriously discussed, this article ana-
lyzes the conditions where a PKO may become viable and provides initial analysis 
for a hypothetical PKO’s ideal composition and disposition. This article proceeds 
as follows. First, I review contemporary research on noncooperative bargaining in 
civil conflicts and how PKOs can alter conflict dynamics. Leveraging historical 
lessons, I then review the 1988–1990 UNGOMAP to explain why that PKO was 
unsuccessful in creating stability in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal. 
I close with policy recommendations, where I explore several possible PKO op-
tions and analyze their potential for incentivizing compliance with a future peace 
settlement. If designed properly and paired with an incentive- compatible intra- 
Afghan settlement, an Afghanistan PKO can fill a critical monitoring and verifi-
cation capacity and bolster Afghanistan’s prospects for long- term stability.
Noncooperative Bargaining, Civil Conflicts, and Peacekeeping
Noncooperative bargaining theory allows for a structured analysis of armed 
conflict and provides a useful lens to analyze Afghanistan’s continued fighting.15 
Based on rational actor assumptions and formal models, these works attempt to 
explain the paradox of why costly wars occur when less costly bargained settle-
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ments may exist.16 Emerging from this literature, information asymmetries and 
commitment problems emerge as two primary factors that generally explain why 
bargaining fails and wars occur.17 While much of the noncooperative bargaining 
theory is designed around interstate wars, civil conflict researchers have found 
that these bargaining obstacles are further exacerbated during civil conflicts, im-
peding bargained settlements and incentivizing conflict recurrence when settle-
ments are in place.18
During civil conflicts, information asymmetries create large obstacles that ob-
struct warring parties from reaching bargained settlements and adhering to peace 
settlements. Since combatants want to get the best deal possible, each side has 
incentives to misrepresent private information about their capabilities, financing, 
strategies, goals, and resolve to appear tougher than they may be in reality.19 It is 
often difficult for opponents to ascertain this private information, and these prob-
lems are exacerbated when rebels use guerilla tactics, enjoy covert external sup-
port, and exploit international borders for sanctuary.20 Rough, inaccessible terrain 
also provides rebels with a degree of sanctuary, shielding them from government 
information collection efforts.21 Civil conflicts ending with decisive military vic-
tories are less likely to revert to fighting, compared to conflicts ending through 
bargained settlements.22
Combatants also struggle to make credible commitments required to end on-
going civil conflicts and sustain peace settlements. First, given the high- stakes 
nature of armed conflict and the possibility that one side may be destroyed, civil 
conflict combatants face large obstacles in realizing the benefits of mutual coop-
eration by credibly committing to a peace settlement.23 Weaker groups are par-
ticularly apprehensive to accept compromises that reduce their relative power. 
This is apparent when rebels with consistent financial flows from contraband 
items like diamonds or opium may have incentives to continue fighting to main-
tain access to those financial flows.24 In cases where a peace settlement does exist, 
relative power shifts can incentivize one side to defect from the agreement and 
continue fighting. If a credible third party is not present during demobilization 
and disarmament, then one side may prefer continued fighting rather than expose 
themselves to future exploitation from a stronger opponent.25 Taken together, 
these incentives to misrepresent private information and difficulties overcoming 
credible commitment problems present clear obstacles to ending civil conflicts 
and sustaining peace settlements during the implementation phase.
Applied to Afghanistan, this research provides helpful insights that partially 
explain why the current civil conflict has persisted for decades. Information asym-
metries complicate intra- Afghan talks, as much remains unknown about the 
Taliban’s strength, the nature of its relationship with Pakistan and al- Qaeda, or 
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even the organization’s ultimate goals.26 The Taliban exploit cross- border sanctu-
ary in Pakistan and Afghanistan’s rugged terrain, limiting the GOA’s and coali-
tion’s military superiority. Vast uncertainty also surrounds the GOA. Though the 
GOA still relies on foreign aid for the majority of its expenses (especially for se-
curity forces), external donors are already curtailing aid spending.27 Afghan Na-
tional Security Forces (ANSF) also remain largely dependent on US and NATO 
military support, and it is unclear how they will perform without foreign sup-
port.28 At the same time, Pres. Ashraf Ghani’s credibility is diminished following 
the contested 2019 presidential election.29 Given these factors, large uncertainty 
exists regarding the GOA’s ability to sustain independent operations. These infor-
mation problems represent significant hurdles for power brokers participating in 
intra- Afghan talks.
In the long run, additional commitment problems will present challenges in 
implementing and enforcing an agreement if one is reached. The Taliban have 
resisted initial negotiations with the GOA and avoided commitments that would 
limit their military strength, like agreeing to ceasefires with the GOA prior to 
finalizing an intra- Afghan settlement.30 The GOA has similarly resisted releasing 
5,000 Taliban prisoners as a precondition for starting intra- Afghan talks, since 
that would strengthen the Taliban’s fighting force. Further complicating matters, 
there appears to be widespread resistance against Taliban ideology among the 
GOA’s core constituents, especially those in urban areas.31 Given these challenges, 
both sides may prefer the high costs of ongoing conflict, rather than risk future 
exploitation that may follow an intra- Afghan settlement. However, noncoopera-
tive bargaining models suggest monitoring mechanisms, like international PKOs, 
may partially alleviate information asymmetries and commitment problems.32
PKOs generally improve compliance with peace settlements, reduce violence 
against civilians, and increase the duration of peace in post–civil conflict environ-
ments.33 PKOs have historically taken on two general forms: traditional and 
transformational.34 Traditional missions are based on impartiality and are focused 
on monitoring and verifying settlements where conflicts have generally ended. 
Transformational missions have expanded mandates, authorizing peacekeepers to 
use force to defend their mandate, and are often paired with more expansive state- 
building missions. During settlement implementation, PKOs deter violations by 
imposing political and military costs on potential defectors.35
Traditional PKOs primarily impose political costs through passive monitoring 
and verification, serving as a neutral arbiter to investigate and report on suspected 
violations and often acting as a buffer between former combatants. In addition to 
those same political costs, transformational PKOs also impose military costs 
through controlled violence aimed at actively compelling defectors toward settle-
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ment compliance. Both types of PKOs can directly lessen commitment and infor-
mation problems by serving as a neutral third party that can offer protection dur-
ing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.36 PKOs with widespread 
geographic coverage and increasing numbers of peacekeepers significantly im-
prove monitoring capacity and are associated with lower levels of violence against 
civilians, compared to missions with smaller troop levels.37
While Afghanistan suffers from several information and commitment prob-
lems that complicate attempts to create and implement an intra- Afghan settle-
ment, PKO research suggests a policy option to mitigate these problems. Af-
ghanistan experts have also stated the need for a third- party monitoring and 
verification mechanism during settlement implementation.38 In the short term, if 
a PKO was agreed on by Afghan parties during talks, this may lessen their uncer-
tainties, supporting a bargained solution. In the long term, a PKO would incen-
tivize compliance with a settlement through monitoring and verification mecha-
nisms. While a transformational PKO in Afghanistan will likely be a nonstarter 
with potential troop- contributing countries and the Taliban, a traditional moni-
toring PKO may present a more acceptable option. Though research suggests a 
properly resourced PKO would support settlement implementation and long- 
term stability, others suggest that underresourced missions do not represent cred-
ible monitoring mechanisms and are not effective at fostering peace.39 To high-
light the dangers of an insufficiently resourced PKO, I next analyze the UN PKO 
that deployed to Afghanistan during the Soviet withdrawal in 1988.
Lessons Learned from UNGOMAP
Building on conflict research, I briefly analyze the UN’s first peacekeeping mis-
sion in Afghanistan, the UNGOMAP. The mission was launched in 1988 at the 
end of the Soviet Union’s ten- year occupation, with a traditional mandate de-
signed to provide limited monitoring and verification mechanisms.40 Since a 
transformational mission with a peace enforcement mandate is not a feasible op-
tion for a future Afghanistan PKO, analyzing UNGOMAP provides useful les-
sons in designing a credible traditional PKO. In short, the UNGOMAP failed to 
foster stability because it was severely underresourced and lacked the force capac-
ity to credibly accomplish its mandate. Further, UNGOMAP was not paired with 
a viable intra- Afghan peace settlement that granted rebels meaningful conces-
sions from the ruling regime in Kabul. This case supports noncooperative bargain-
ing theory’s projections of civil conflicts continuing in the face of significant in-
formation and commitment problems. Moreover, it highlights an underresourced 
PKO’s acute inadequacies and provides important lessons for optimally designing 
a future Afghanistan PKO.
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The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 to support Kabul’s be-
sieged communist regime, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). 
Soviet and PDPA forces were confronted by various Islamist mujahideen insur-
gent factions, which were financially and logistically supported by the United 
States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and China. The Soviets and PDPA failed to rees-
tablish control, and the brutal fighting left one million Afghans killed and dis-
placed five million refugees.41 Seeking to end its costly quagmire, the Soviets be-
gan multilateral negotiations in support of an exit strategy in 1986. While the 
Soviets sought to keep a friendly PDPA regime in power, after three years of 
failed intra- Afghan peace talks, Moscow eventually agreed to withdraw its mili-
tary forces without an internal peace settlement.42
The UN facilitated the subsequent Geneva Accords, which were signed in April 
1988 by the United States, Soviet Union, Pakistan, and Afghanistan’s PDPA re-
gime. The Accords provided an international framework to end the Soviet occu-
pation and enable the voluntary return of Afghan refugees.43 As the Soviets were 
not yet willing to fully abandon their PDPA allies, the Accords failed to meaning-
fully address Afghanistan’s ongoing civil conflict. All mujahideen leaders were 
excluded from the Geneva negotiations, and the PDPA retained power in Kabul.44 
The incomplete agreement failed to “provide a robust groundwork for future po-
litical stability, good governance, or peace,” and intra- Afghan parties were left to 
seek a settlement on their own.45
Entering this complex and ongoing civil conflict, UNGOMAP’s mandate con-
sisted of three primary tasks: to monitor (1) the withdrawal of Soviet forces, (2) 
the mutual noninterference between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and (3) the vol-
untary return of refugees.46 However, the mission was severely underresourced, 
consisting of only 50 multinational military observers who were spread between 
five outposts.47 While UNGOMAP successfully facilitated the Soviets’ military 
withdrawal, the understaffed mission was simply incapable of credibly monitoring 
its latter two mandates or investigating alleged violations.48 Without a credible 
UN monitoring mechanism in place to identify interference, the United States 
and its allies sought to unseat the communist PDPA regime and continued sup-
porting the mujahideen with financial and military aid.49 The Soviets reciprocated 
with ongoing military and financial aid to the PDPA regime. Separate UN efforts 
to negotiate a diplomatic solution among intra- Afghan parties were hindered by 
this ongoing covert proxy support, with both sides hoping to secure a decisive 
military solution.50 While the PDPA in Kabul registered complaints of these Ge-
neva Accords violations, UNGOMAP lacked the personnel to properly investi-
gate, and in- fighting continued.51
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Despite pressure from the Soviets, internal efforts to draft an intra- Afghan 
peace deal, like PDPA president Mohammad Najibullah’s National Reconcilia-
tion Agenda, failed to grant enough concessions to mujahideen.52 The majority of 
mujahideen factions refused to even talk with the PDPA regime. Without an 
incentive- compatible peace settlement or a credible third- party monitoring 
mechanism, mujahideen groups fractured into numerous competing groups, 
spawning regional conflicts as warlords battled for local control.53 As then–UN 
Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar recalled the breakup of various Mujahi-
deen groups, he noted that “victory eliminated the single objective that united 
them.”54 Internal fighting quickly derailed intra- Afghan negotiations, and Af-
ghanistan’s various warring parties continued fighting following the final Soviet 
withdrawal in February 1989.55 UNGOMAP’s troop contributing countries 
(Austria, Canada, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal, Poland, and 
Sweden) were apprehensive about extending their peacekeepers as violence spi-
raled, and the UNSC ended the mission on 15 March 1990.
Analysis of UNGOMAP suggests the underresourced mission was destined 
for failure. First, the PKO was launched without a viable intra- Afghan settlement 
that would have incentivized peace among warring Afghan parties. Second, the 
mission’s 50 personnel were incapable of implementing UNGOMAP’s limited 
mandate. Third, the mandate was almost exclusively focused on interstate dynam-
ics (among the United States, Pakistan, PDPA regime, and Soviet Union) and 
ignored intra- Afghan conflict.56 Without a viable settlement or credible third- 
party monitoring mechanism backed by a legitimating mandate, internal Afghan 
parties proved incapable of overcoming information and commitment challenges 
and continued fighting. Beyond these internal dynamics, additional peacekeepers, 
with greater geographical reach, were needed for a credible monitoring and veri-
fication mechanism to incentivize mutual noninterference in Afghanistan from 
external parties and support refugee resettlement.
As the Cold War ended and Washington and Moscow agreed to cease support-
ing warring factions in December 1991, UNGOMAP was already disbanded, 
internal violence levels were rising, and the political will for a new PKO did not 
exist.57 Two months after Soviet military and financial aid ceased, the PDPA gov-
ernment in Kabul collapsed and Afghanistan descended into chaos.58 As the 
great- power proxy competition ended, the international political atmosphere fa-
cilitated the abandonment of Afghanistan, and remaining external influence from 
Pakistan fueled continuing civil conflict, eventually leading to the establishment 
of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 1996 and a safe haven for in-
ternational terrorists.
190  JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  WINTER 2020
Van Wie
In summary, UNGOMAP provides an instructive case for how an underre-
sourced PKO may fail in providing stability and incentivizing compliance with a 
peace settlement. Commenting on states that relapse back into fighting, Barbara 
Walter notes, “Commitment problems are more likely to emerge in countries 
where no third party has offered to help with the transition, or where peacekeep-
ers were inadequate (e.g., they failed to arrive, they were too few to offer a credible 
force, or they left before the military and political transitions were complete).”59 
Though successful in verifying the withdrawal of conventional Soviet forces, UN-
GOMAP was not paired with a viable intra- Afghan settlement and lacked the 
capacity required to credibly monitor Afghanistan and Pakistan’s mutual nonin-
terference. Lacking a mandate and resources to credibly monitor intra- Afghan 
parties, the PKO failed to meaningfully ease commitment and information prob-
lems hindering intra- Afghan bargaining efforts. Applying the historical lessons 
from UNGOMAP’s shortcomings and conflict studies’ work on noncooperative 
bargaining and PKOs, I next outline several policy options for PKO packages that 
may incentivize compliance with an intra- Afghan peace settlement.
Policy Options for an Afghanistan PKO
Conflict research and history provide invaluable lessons for how a well- 
resourced PKO may support an intra- Afghan peace agreement and long- term 
stability in Afghanistan. Below, I briefly outline three PKO options and then 
analyze each option’s benefits and costs. As initially discussed above, this PKO 
cannot occur without an intra- Afghan peace settlement and consent. While this 
currently appears improbable, conditions may change over time, and a credible 
PKO’s possibility could lessen uncertainty during intra- Afghan negotiations and 
provide a means of arriving at a settlement, especially if talks are stalemated. Later, 
I assess the likelihood of Afghan parties granting consent.
As noted above, these options are based on traditional peacekeeping missions, 
designed to passively monitor and verify a settlement’s provisions. Specifically, all 
three PKOs presented below would likely monitor a cease fire, investigate alleged 
settlement violations, and support refugee resettlement. Peacekeepers would be 
lightly armed with relatively narrow mandates that only authorized the use of 
force for self- defense.60 A robust peace enforcement mission with a transforma-
tional mandate that authorized the use of force to enforce a settlement would 
likely not be acceptable for the Taliban, nor for troop- contributing countries. 
From the Taliban’s limited public statements, it is clear that they would not accept 
a peace enforcement PKO, and pursuing this approach would immediately negate 
Afghan consent.61
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• Option 1 Broad Coverage: Afghanistan’s civil conflict has engulfed the major-
ity of the country, and current estimates suggest that 190 districts (of 397 total 
districts) are currently contested between the Taliban and the GOA.62 Pre-
sumably, these districts would be ideal locations for a peacekeeping force to 
monitor a ceasefire and assist with combatant demobilization and reintegra-
tion. Though detailed troop- to- task analysis is required, company- sized ele-
ments would provide the minimum force required to monitor and patrol each 
formerly contested district, while providing requisite force protection func-
tions at respective PKO outposts.63 PKO battalions should also be located in 
the ten largest cities, with a regiment based in Kabul. In total, the entire PKO 
force would approach 25,000. Based on estimates from contemporary PKOs, 
this mission would cost approximately 2 billion USD annually.64
• Option 2 Medium Coverage: Rather than focusing on contested districts 
and cities, this option would only deploy peacekeepers in major cities. Using 
a threshold of 200,000 residents to define major city, the PKO would send 
one to two battalions to each of Afghanistan’s ten largest cities, and a regi-
ment to Kabul. In total, this would comprise approximately 12,000 peace-
keepers. Using similar financial projections as described above, this mission 
would cost approximately 1 billion USD annually.
• Option 3 Narrow Coverage: Options 1 and 2 may be too intrusive to attain 
intra- Afghan consent for a PKO. This final option presents the smallest PKO 
possible that could provide a credible monitoring mechanism. Under this op-
tion, a PKO regiment would be based in Kabul, with PKO battalions based in 
Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar- e- Sharif. In total, this mission would require 
5,000 peacekeepers and would cost approximately 500 million USD annually.
Option Analysis and Recommendations
Option 1’s broad coverage provides the most credible force to fulfill crucial 
monitoring, verification, and investigation mechanisms that would incentivize 
settlement compliance and deter violations. The PKO’s wide geographic footprint 
supports widespread monitoring during the implementation phase and enables 
peacekeepers to verify if Afghanistan is being used as a terrorist safe haven. It 
further allows peacekeepers to promptly investigate alleged settlement violations. 
If acceptable to intra- Afghan parties, the sizable force in this option could moni-
tor and assist with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former 
combatants. Considering that the current US military mission costs approximately 
45–50 billion USD annually for 12,000 troops, this option’s 2 billion USD annual 
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cost is relatively modest.65 However, there are also real drawbacks to this option. 
First, the large peacekeeping force and budget would make this one of the largest 
PKOs ever conducted, and it would require large financial and troop contribu-
tions from supporting states. As the COVID-19 pandemic has ravaged econo-
mies around the globe, this option’s steep financial burden may not be feasible.66 
Further, the larger footprint means that peacekeepers will face increased vulner-
abilities. Hundreds of small, company- sized outposts, and platoon- level patrols 
will be vulnerable to attacks by potential spoilers like Islamic State–Khorasan 
(IS–K).67 Because it is difficult to mitigate option 1’s increased risk, it is unclear if 
the political will exists in potential troop- contributing countries (TCC) to sup-
port the PKO. When Afghanistan’s rugged geography is paired with the PKO’s 
wide coverage, this also increases the logistical burden on the PKO headquarters, 
requiring additional service, support, and medical evacuation assets. Finally, and 
most importantly, it is unclear if key Taliban stakeholders would willingly consent 
to a large foreign force in their country, as suggested in Taliban Deputy Sirajuddin 
Haqqani’s recent New York Times op- ed.68
 Option 2’s medium coverage presents lower risk to peacekeepers but does so at 
the cost of significantly degraded monitoring and verification capabilities. Basing 
PKO contingents in the cities will allow for bases with hardened force protection 
measures. When paired with the PKO’s concentration in fewer locations, the risk 
to peacekeepers is significantly reduced, which may assist in recruiting TCCs. The 
reduced troop requirements will also halve the required PKO costs and ease PKO 
headquarters’ logistical burdens. Though it will not provide coverage to Afghani-
stan’s rural population, option 2 still covers 22.4 percent of Afghanistan’s total 
population of 36.6 million people.69 Despite these benefits to TCCs and financial 
backers, option 2’s reduced troop presence decreases the PKO’s ability to credibly 
monitor and verify a future settlement. This reduced coverage increases risks of 
settlement violations in rural areas, as local power brokers may be incentivized to 
use violence to assert control. This plan lacks the requisite forces to support disar-
mament and demobilization throughout Afghanistan. Further, it increases the 
risk that terrorist organizations will use Afghanistan to train, plan, and conduct 
operations in remote areas. The smaller peacekeeping force will lack capacity to 
credibly investigate alleged violations, outside of the cities where peacekeepers are 
based. This risk can potentially be mitigated by sending PKO patrols to investi-
gate violations and supplementing the mission with unmanned, unarmed surveil-
lance drones to monitor remote locations. However, long- range patrolling in-
creases risk to peacekeepers and will strain local PKO contingents’ available 
manpower and logistical support.
A Peacekeeping Mission in Afghanistan
JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS  WINTER 2020  193
Option 3’s narrow coverage magnifies the risks and benefits from option 2. The 
smaller PKO footprint located in major cities decreases risk to peacekeepers, de-
creases resupply burdens, and significantly lowers the mission’s financial costs. 
Approximately 17 percent of Afghanistan’s total population and most large busi-
ness interests reside in these four cities, and those Afghans would benefit from the 
additional security and stability brought by the PKO’s direct presence. Though 
this option entails large risks with further reductions to monitoring and verifica-
tion capabilities, it still provides a degree of geographic coverage. This force’s small 
size further reduces the PKO’s credibility, and it would not be able to support 
disarmament and demobilization, and its investigatory capacity would be limited 
to local areas surrounding the four host cities.70
Table 1: Credible Afghanistan peacekeeping options overview
PKO Factors Option 1 “Broad” Opt. 2 “Medium” Opt. 3 “Narrow”
Estimated Size 25,000 12,000 5,000
Estimated Annual Cost $2 billion* $1 billion* $500 million*
Monitoring Capability High Moderate Low
Verification Capability High Moderate Low
Afghanistan Population 
Coverage 30-40%** 22.4% 17%
Risk to PKO High Low Low
PKO Logistical Burden High Moderate Low
Shared Factors Traditional PKO with lightly armed forces, authorized to use force in self- defense, focused on settlement monitoring and verification
* See endnote 63. Further financial analysis is required.
** Depends on ultimate composition and disposition of company- sized PKO units.
Of these possibilities, the option 1 provides the best monitoring and verifica-
tion capability. Its wider geographic coverage will better enable peacekeepers to 
support disarmament and demobilization and credibly monitor a ceasefire and an 
intra- Afghan peace settlement’s implementation. Further, it can promptly inves-
tigate alleged violations. Despite increased risks to dispersed peacekeepers, this 
PKO’s presence would be critical to deterring widespread violations and local 
power struggles. It is possible that intra- Afghan parties may consent to a PKO 
but resist this plan’s wide geographic coverage and large foreign presence. Further, 
COVID-19’s economic impacts and risk averse TCCs may avoid this option’s 
large costs and troop requirements. Under these circumstances, it is important to 
note that these options are clearly not distinct choices. Rather they represent a 
continuum of possibilities. The exact PKO composition and disposition could be 
scaled up or down, based on Afghan requests and TCCs’ willingness and avail-
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ability to contribute. While the US government should advocate for a broad cov-
erage plan, if that is not acceptable to applicable parties, then scaling down to 
medium or narrow coverage would still partially support a settlement. In the long 
run, even narrow coverage would still provide an intra- Afghanistan peace settle-
ment with increased probability of success.
Anything less than option 3 would no longer represent a credible monitoring 
and verification mechanism. For example, a PKO regiment based only in Kabul 
would represent a purely symbolic force that would not incentivize compliance 
with an intra- Afghan deal. Investing in a suboptimal PKO would be unwise, since 
it will give the Taliban the illusion of granting a concession, yet the mission would 
lack credible monitoring and verification capacity, negating all potential benefits 
outlined above. Given likely Taliban objections toward a PKO and increasing 
Western impetuous to withdrawal, the most probable Afghanistan PKO outcome 
appears to be a lightly resourced, symbolic mission that lacks the resources needed 
to provide a credible monitoring and verification mechanism. As seen with UN-
GOMAP, an ineffectual PKO will not relieve the information and commitment 
problems that prolong conflict and incentivize reversion to fighting. Should the 
Taliban reject all these options, then the US and international community will be 
forced to rely on ongoing financial aid as its primary mechanism to incentivize 
settlement agreement and compliance.
Critics of these proposals may allege that an Afghanistan PKO may result in 
another indefinite mission, similar to those seen in the Congo and Darfur. How-
ever, this PKO does not need to be indefinite. Rather, it needs to provide monitor-
ing and verification mechanisms while an intra- Afghan settlement is being im-
plemented. During this fragile period, former combatants who are demobilizing 
will be vulnerable, spoilers will seek to inject confusion and misattribute attacks in 
efforts to derail successful implementation and compliance. As described above, a 
credible PKO could support stability during that transition period. Others may 
worry about an aggressive PKO that is used to enforce a future settlement. How-
ever, as I argued above, this PKO should be used as a monitoring and verification 
mechanism, rather than a transformative state- building mission that seeks to 
enforce the settlement. As noted by Lise Howard, peacekeeping missions are not 
counterinsurgency operations. Rather PKOs are based on “impartiality, consent of 
the warring factions, and the non- use of force.”71
Beyond the features I outlined above, a potential Afghanistan PKO should 
consider the following points to increase the mission’s probability of success:
• Ideal Troop Contributing Countries: Operation Enduring Freedom com-
batants would not likely be acceptable to the Taliban, given neutrality con-
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siderations. Thus, troops from NATO members, Jordan, South Korea, Japan, 
Nepal, Ukraine, Georgia, Australia, and New Zealand cannot be used. Simi-
larly, history, regional interests, and geopolitics disqualify Pakistan, India, 
Russia, and China. Possible options include capable South American states 
(i.e., Brazil, Columbia), African states (i.e., Senegal, Egypt), Indonesia, and 
Bangladesh. Though these states lack advanced militaries and regional ex-
pertise, a lightly armed PKO would not require advanced capabilities, and 
interpreters and liaisons could be attached to smaller units.72 It is unclear 
whether any of these states would willingly contribute forces to this high- 
risk mission. However, if a neutral PKO was operating with intra- Afghan 
consent, then risk to observers would be reduced. The United States and 
UNSC could further entice TCCs with financial and equipment incen-
tives—though these will further increase the mission’s costs.
• Leadership: The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has 
the infrastructure and skill required to manage a complex PKO.73 The mul-
tilateral nature of DPKO would enhance the mission’s neutrality and legiti-
macy. Other regional organizations like the Collective Security Treaty Or-
ganization or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
would not possess requisite neutrality. Considering the UNSC’s interest in 
a stable Afghanistan, the Permanent Five would likely approve a DPKO- 
led PKO in Afghanistan.
• Capabilities: While the options above outlined basic PKO monitoring mis-
sions, several additional functions can be forecasted. In the options above, 
the PKO will not allow perfect coverage of Afghanistan’s 397 districts. The 
mission should employ unmanned, unarmed surveillance drones to monitor 
districts without peacekeepers and conduct rapid aerial investigations of re-
ported settlement violations. This drone capability would be even more im-
portant under medium or narrow coverage plans; however, most ideal TCCs 
lack these capabilities organically, and some technical requirements may 
need to be contracted. Explosive ordnance disposal units would be critical 
for demining and safely disposing of unexploded ordnance, which will be 
critical in minimizing harm to noncombatants.74 Trained election monitors 
could monitor ballot stations if elections were part of a settlement.
• Counterterrorism Mission: Some analysts have argued that Afghanistan re-
quires an external counterterrorism force to continue advise and assist op-
erations with Afghan special forces to target remaining IS–K and extremist 
cells. Though not likely, if accepted by Afghan parties, this force should be 
excluded from the PKO, as this would violate the mission’s impartiality.
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Is a PKO a Realistic Option?
At this time, it appears unlikely that key Taliban power brokers would willingly 
consent to a PKO.75 To date, the Taliban have consistently communicated that 
one of their main objectives is the departure of all international forces from Af-
ghanistan.76 Despite that fact, there is reason to believe that the Taliban may 
eventually be willing to accept a neutral PKO mission whose presence is based on 
Afghan consent, rather than a great power viewed as an invader. The status quo’s 
ongoing fighting is costly, and estimates suggest at least 42,100 Taliban fighters 
have been killed over the last 19 years.77 It is clear that intra- Afghan talks will be 
contentious and GOA power brokers doubt the Taliban’s willingness and ability 
to credibly commit to a settlement’s provisions. Stalemated negotiations will con-
tinue these costs for both the Taliban and the GOA. To gain desired reforms and 
end the costly status quo, the Taliban may willingly accept a short- term, consent- 
based PKO in exchange for bargained concessions that produced an incentive- 
compatible agreement.
The Taliban’s success to date does not speak to the organization’s ability to 
achieve a decisive military takeover of Afghanistan in its entirety. If the Taliban 
were to abandon intra- Afghan negotiations and seek a decisive military conclu-
sion, it would incur large costs and face significant risks. While some estimates 
place the Taliban’s military force at 150,000, the ANSF still have more than 
300,000 soldiers.78 While the Taliban control 19 percent of Afghanistan’s districts, 
the GOA maintains control of 46 percent of the total population.79 Survey data 
suggests that close to 70 percent of the population feel “threatened” by the Tali-
ban, and large majorities oppose significant changes to the existing constitution’s 
civil liberties.80 These figures suggest the Taliban are far from parity with the GOA 
and lack the widespread support needed for a complete takeover. During the 
Taliban’s initial rise to power in 1996, they failed to completely control the entire 
country and spent five years fighting the Northern Alliance.81 Even if the GOA 
were to fragment under pressure from the Taliban and reduced external support, 
many experts doubt the Taliban would gain complete control of the country.82
Though not guaranteed, it is also possible that the United States may return to 
support its former GOA allies in a limited capacity. As seen in Operation Inher-
ent Resolve and the campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the 
United States military and international partners provided critical combat capa-
bilities with minimal ground forces to enable successful host- nation military of-
fensives. Further, if the Taliban did abandon talks for a military offensive, the 
United States could pursue aggressive aerial targeting of Afghan opium fields in 
Taliban- held areas, cutting off a critical source of Taliban financing. Thus, while 
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the Taliban may consider a military solution, rather than a diplomatic one, doing 
so would likely entail high costs.
Continued financial aid also provides the international community with fur-
ther leverage to advocate for a PKO. Afghanistan will require significant and 
sustained financial assistance for the foreseeable future. This is evident as the 
GOA currently collects 2.5 billion USD in revenue to support an annual budget 
of 11 billion USD.83 Though security expenditures should decrease following a 
settlement, Afghanistan will still require significant funding to support recovery, 
basic government services, and economic development.84 Several studies have 
found that external financial aid can lower the probability of civil conflicts recur-
rence.85 To incentivize intra- Afghan consent, some aid could be conditional on 
intra- Afghan parties accepting a PKO. Since the Taliban would be part of a post- 
settlement Afghan state, they will directly benefit from this continued financial 
support. When this aid is paired with a PKO, it provides donors with an impartial 
method of verifying their funds are being used as directed.86 Therefore, this inter-
national financial aid presents a critical tool to incentive intra- Afghan (especially 
Taliban) consent for a PKO.
Conclusion
Though the Taliban will not likely change their public insistence on the com-
plete withdrawal of all foreign forces in the near- term, this could change in the 
future. Just as the PDPA maintained power for several years following the Soviet 
withdrawal, the GOA may prove it can independently maintain relative military 
superiority without US and NATO forces and continue inflicting large costs on 
Taliban forces. If this occurs, then the Taliban may be willing to consent to a 
credible PKO in the short term to reap the long- term benefits from an incentive- 
compatible settlement. Over the last 20 years, the Taliban have demonstrated an 
impressive strategic patience and willingness to play the long game.87 The Taliban 
agreeing to a PKO would be an important signal that its leadership generally in-
tend to comply with the provisions of an intra- Afghan agreement, and this signal 
may be critical in convincing GOA elites to reach a settlement. Though a PKO 
has not been widely discussed or advocated for by GOA elites, given the informa-
tion and commitment problems outlined above, it represents a viable mechanism 
to dissuade Taliban defections.
While the United States has strategic interest in a stable, safe- haven- free Af-
ghanistan, it appears likely that US troops will completely withdraw—potentially 
in the next year. To prepare for a future Afghanistan without the US military’s 
coercive leverage, Washington needs to support options that bolster an intra- 
Afghan settlement’s probability for success. While financial aid will be necessary 
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to provide a degree of leverage, it likely will not be sufficient to completely incen-
tivize compliance with a settlement. Repeating Afghanistan’s reversion to civil 
war following the Soviet withdrawal is not an acceptable option. If Afghanistan 
again becomes a failed state, it poses a direct threat to US and international se-
curity interests. Experts have forecasted a massive refugee exodus, which would 
further destabilize Europe.88 Groups like IS–K and al- Qaeda would exploit the 
chaos to take advantage of the safe haven, recruit new members, and continue 
exporting violence outside of Afghanistan’s borders.89 Already filled with tension 
between Pakistan and India, South Asia’s stability would be further threatened, 
and spillover into Pakistan places that state’s nuclear arsenal at risk.90 Given 
these dangers, the United States and international community should seriously 
consider reasonable measures to support a bargained solution and long- term 
stability in Afghanistan.
While an Afghanistan PKO may not be viable now, this could change in the 
future, and analyzing requisite conditions and a PKO’s ideal composition is 
worthwhile, given the high stakes involved. If an intra- Afghan settlement appears 
possible in the coming years, an Afghan PKO offers a credible mechanism for 
intra- Afghan parties to attain desired concessions and achieve internal stability. 
US policy makers should conduct feasibility assessments on a future PKO. US 
negotiators could begin quietly socializing the possibility of a PKO with intra- 
Afghan parties, and the Department of State could begin confidential initial 
planning with the UN DPKO, potential TCCs, and financial backers. While the 
United States cannot direct other states to contribute to a PKO, Washington can 
leverage its diplomatic and economic power to identify contributors, secure finan-
cial backers, and work toward a UNSC mandate to authorize the mission. If a 
credible PKO was assembled, then GOA negotiators could bargain for a PKO 
during negotiations with the Taliban. Contingent on Afghan consent, this option 
may alleviate GOA uncertainties in negotiations with the Taliban and clear the 
way for an eventual acceptance and implementation of an intra- Afghan peace 
agreement. The dangerous prospects of continued fighting in Afghanistan neces-
sitate immediate efforts to support long- term peace and stability. 
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